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ABSTRAK
Firma-firma audit mempunyai inseI1lif untuk menyemak secara terperinci dan melaporkan kesahihan segala
aktiviti yang tercatat dalam penyata-penyata kewangan yang disediakan oleh pihak pengurusan firma yang
memohon UI1luk disenaraikan di Bursa Saham Kuala Lumpur. Insentif ini berdasarkan keinginan ul1tuk
mempenahankan reputasi mereka sebagai agensi yang benanggungjawab. Oleh itu pelabur dapat
menjangkakan nilai sebenar firma-firma yang akan disenaraikan itu dengan lebih tepat dan ini mengurangkan
tahap ketidakpastian ex-ante dan dijangka menghasilkan premium yang rendah sewaktu penyenaraian. Kajian
mengenai kaitan reputasi firma audit dan tahap premium sewaktu penyenaraian telah dibuat atas 100 firma
yang di senarai di papan kedua Bursa Saham Kuala Lumpur, UI1luk jangkamasa 1990 hingga 1995. Enam
firma audit yang terkenal di kelaskan sebagai big-six dan firma audit yang selainnya dianggap mempunyai
tahap reputasi yang lebih rendah dan dikelaskan sebagai non big-six. Penemuan kajian menunjukan tidak ada
kaitan signifikan antara reputasi firma audit dengan tahap premium penyenaraian yang diperolehi oleh firma
yang diaudit. Ini bermaksud, pelabur di Malaysia menganggap bahawa semua firma audit yang berlesen
memberi perkhidmatan homogen. Penemuan kajian menunjukan reputasi penajajamin dan preslasi kenlungan
yang lepas ada kaitan negatif, manakala, arah ali ran pasaran saham dan sisihan piawai pulangan sekitar
penyenaraian ada kaitan positif dengan tahap premium yang di perolehi semasa penyenaraian.
ABSTRACT
Reputable auditing firms have an incentive to investigate and repon irregularities since their reputation is at
stake, therefore engaging their services enables investors to estimate the value of the firm more precisely and
reduce ex ante uncenainty. This will attract more investors to bid for the IPO shares and consequently IPOs
attested by reputable auditing firms will have a lower premium level. This study tests the conjectured inverse
effect of reputation of auditing firms on the level of IPO underpricing of 100 companies listed on the second
board of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, for the period 1990-1995. The reputable auditing firms are the
Big Six accounting firms; the others are classified as less reputable. The findings do not support this
conjecture, which implies that Malaysian investors assume that all qualified and licensed auditing firms
provide homogeneous services. However, the findings show that the undenvriter reputation (UV{) and the
past profitability of the firm (NPM) variables are inversely related, whereas the market trend and the standard
deviation variables are positively associated to the level of IPO underpricing.
INTRODUCTION
Documented evidence on the premiums earned
by investors in initial public offers (IPOs) in
developed share markets (Ibbotson 1975;
Ibbotson and Jaffe 1975; Ritter 1984; Aggrawal
and Rivoli 1990) suggests a general underpricing.
Studies on the underpricing of Malaysian IPOs
(Ariff and Johnson 1990; Shamsher et al. 1994)
suggest an average underpricing of 130% at the
end of the first day of listing and 77% if the
shares are held and old three years after listing.
This excessive underpricing is the highest in the
world and cannot be completely explained by
the fundamental and market factors. Unlike
other markets, there is little documented
evidence on the explanations for the
Shamsher Mohamael anel Annuar Mohel Nassir
underpricing of IPOs in Malaysia. However,
Shamsher et at. (1994) suggest that the public
policy goal of equitable wealth distribution
among the various ethnic groups as a rationale
for the intentional excessive underpricing.
Various [actors have been suggested in the
literature as the possible reasons for
underpricing, such as ex ante uncertainty and
state of the market prior to issue (McGuinness
1992), asymmetric information between
underwriter and issuer (Leyland and Pyle 1977),
adverse selection problem of uninformed and
informed investors (Rock 1986), adverse
incentives of undenvriters to reduce undenvriting
risk (Baron 1982), insider signalling to
differentiate the quality of issues (Ritter 1984;
Beatty and Ritter 1986), and price pressures
during the initial period of issue (Aggrawal and
Rivoli 1990). The inverse effect of auditing firm
reputation on the level of IPO underpricing is
documented in the literature, but the findings
are inconclusive as Balvers et al. (1989) and
Beatty (1989) suggest a significant inverse
relationship whereas McGuinness (1992) and
Ng et at. (1994) suggest no significant
relationship.
This study focuses on the effect of reputation
of auditing firms on the level of IPO underpricing
on the second board of the Kuala Lumpur Stock
Exchange. One hundred IPOs were analysed for
the period 1990-1995.
THEORETICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
AUDITOR FIRM REPUTATION AND IPO
UNDERP~CING
Managers of IPOs are assumed to have private
information abollt the future prospects of the
company and it is in their interest to convey the
information to prospective investors to reduce
underpricing of the IPOs. This information is
usually provided through a prospectus which
includes information on financial status, future
prospects and audited financial statements. In
Malaysia, it is a mandatory requirement under
the Companies Act 1965 for IPOs to issue a
prospectus including audited financial
statements, which are considered an important
element in the prospectus. Financial statements
audited by more reputable auditing firms are
perceived to be more credible to prospective
investors than those audited by less reputable
auditing firms. This preference on the part of
prospective investors may be explained in terms
of the need to minimize monitoring cost.
Auditing services are demanded as monitoring
devices to minimize agency cost because of the
conflict of interest bet>veen owners and managers
(Watts and Zimmerman 1983).
Since very little is known of the IPOs, and
prospective investors must rely on the disclosures
in a prospectus to evaluate the future prospects,
credible financial statements are required to
enable investors to trust the disclosed infonnation
to eliminate the need to search for alternative
sources of information for verification purposes.
Since in Malaysia the allocation of shares to the
public is based on the lottery system, the costs of
an information search (if verification is required)
may not be compensated by the number of
shares allocated, therefore requiring a greater
level of underpricing to attract potential investors.
The provision of credible financial statements
serves to reduce the monitoring cost.
DeAngelo (1981) and Simunic and Stein
(1987) suggest that the credibility of financial
statements depends on the perceived quality of
the audit. A higher perceived quality of audit is
more likely to be associated with a more
reputable auditing firm because of their larger
collateral properties (and therefore greater
presumed reputation at stake) and confidence
of investors in the auditing firm's reputation for
accuracy and reliability of information audited.
Therefore, the more reputable the auditing firm
employed by an IPO, the less the chance of
misrepresentation by the managers' disclosures,
consequently lower costs of monitoring and lower
underpricing of the IPO.
Beatty and Ritter (1986) suggest that the
greater the ex ante uncertainty, the greater the
expected underpricing of the IPO. The owners
of the company have an incentive to signal their
private information about the firm's future
prospects to reduce ex ante uncertainty. However,
the effectiveness of this mechanism is mitigated
by the IPO companies with relatively high ex ante
uncertainty to signal low ex ante uncertainty. The
role of an auditing firm in providing credentials
to disclosed information is important to mitigate
this problem.
Reputable auditing firms have an incentive
to investigate and report irregularities since their
reputation is at stake, therefore engaging their
services enables investors to estimate the value
of the company more precisely and reduce ex
ante uncertainty. This will attract more investors
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The AGE variable represents the age of the
IPO company from the date of incorporation. A
longer operating history provides more
information on the quality of management and
enables investors to evaluate the prospective value
of the company from past information. An
arbitrary benchmark of 10 years was chosen with
the hope that a longer history reduces investor
ex anIe uncertainty about the true value of the
company, and therefore results in less
underpricing of the IPO.
The % OFFER variable reflects the expected
monitoring costs. Jensen and Meckling (1976)
suggest that the lower the percentage of shares
held by insiders (therefore the higher percentage
held by outsiders) the higher the monitoring
costs and the lower the level of underpricing. In
this respect, Downes and Heinkel (1982) and
Beatty (!989) show that the percentage retained
by insiders signals private information to
outsiders.
The standard deviation of returns (SD)
variable denotes the ex posl proxy for the ex anIe
uncertainty to control for ex anle uncertain ty in
the sample. Beatty and Ritter (1986) suggest a
positive relationship between SD and level of
underpricing. The average net profit margin
(NPM) for the last five years reflects the expected
future performance of the the company.
Higher expected future performance
reduces the risk of buying the IPO and therefore
reduces the level of underpricing.
The underwriter replllation variable (UW)
controls underwriter reputation as Balvers pi al.
(1989) found thal underwriter reputation has
to bid for the IPO shares, and consequently
IPOs attested by reputable auditing firms will
have lower level of premiums.
This study tests whether there is a significant
inverse relationship between auditing firm
reputation and underpricing of Malaysian IPOs.
Specifically, IPO companies that engage the
services of more reputable firms should exhibit
lower underpricing than companies that engage
the services of less reputable auditing firms. For
the purpose of this study, the reputable auditing
firms are those that are internationally classified
as the Big Six operating in the market and the
rest are classified as non-Big Six.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The data for this study were drawn from 100
IPOs from the second board of the Kuala
Lumpur Stock Exchange for the period
1990-1995. The source for the variables used in
the regression analysis was the companies'
prospectuses, and the share prices were extracted
from the daily diary published by the Kuala
Lumpur Stock Exchange. Following the
guidelines by McGuinness (1992) and g et al.
(1994), a regression model was used to test the
conjectured inverse relationship between
auditing firm reputation and level of IPO
underpricing. The factors of ex ante uncertainty,
perception of company value, other reputation
effects and state of the market prior to the IPO
were controlled in the step-wise regression model.
The auditor reputation conjecture was tested by
the estimated coefficients of the more reputable
auditing firms (Big Six) and the less reputable
auditing firms (non-Big Six) indicator variables.
The linear regression model is expressed as
follows:
UPi = bo + bi (AGE) + b~ (%OFFER) + b" (SD)
+ b
l
( TPM) +b,; (UW) + bti (MKT) + b 7 (AUD)
+ e i
where
UP the level of underpricing at the
end of first day after listing;
AGE operating history of the company;
a dummy variable approach is used
with a benchmark of 10 years;
%OFFER = percentage of shares owned by
outside investors after the offering;
SD standard deviation of daily returns
NPM
UW
MKT
AUD
e
for days 2-14 after first trading
day;
the company's average profit
margin for the last 5 years;
underwriter reputation group;
indicator variable takes a value of
1 if it is from reputable group,
otherwise 0;
the state of the market prior to
the listing, measured by the
moving average of 15 days' returns
on the KLSE Composite Index;
auditor reputation group; indi-
cator variable takes a value of 1 if
it is from the reputable group
(Big Six), otherwise 0;
error term
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AGE AUD INSIDER NPM SO U'vV
1.00 -0.0456 -0.03]5 -0.151 -0.0818 .00082
1.00 02674 0.108301226 -0.]607
] .00 0.0783 -0.0688 0.0845
1.00 0.1096 0.0896
1.00 0.] 679
1.00
AGE
AUD
Ii\:SIDER
NPM
SD
UW
(b) Regression Results
TABLE 2
Correlation matrix for the explanatory variables
in the regression analysis (Second Board IPOs)
TABLE 3
Regression Results for the auditor finn reputation
model (Second Board)
Six ranges from 59 to 101 % and there is no
significant difference (F = 0.18) between the
average level of underpricing among them.The
level of average underpricing for all the Big Six
firms was 76% and not significantly different (F=
1.11) fmm the 72% for the Non Big Six firms.
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix for
the independent variables used in the study.
The correlation matrix indicates that the
correlation among the independent variables is
small (less than 0.20), implying that there is no
significant multicollinearity problem that could
affect the interpretation of the results of the
regression analysis. Kaplan (1982) and Emory
(1982) suggest that multicollinearity could be a
problem when the correlation exceeds 0.80.
FINDINGS
DesClijJlive Analysis
Table 1 shows the statistics for the second board
IPOs. The average underpricing is 74%, which is
relatively high and is a common feature of the
Malaysian IPOs. Among the Big Six auditing
firms, KPMG Peat Marwick, Ernst & Young and
Coopers and Lybrand audited 45 IPOs in total,
which is 70% of those audited by the Big Six.
The level of average underpricing within the Big
an impact on the level of IPO underpricing.
IPOs with reputable underwriters have a lower
level of underpricing. The reputation of the
underwriters is proxied by their LUrnover during
the period of study, assuming large underwriters
have a greater reputation at stake.
The state of the market prior to the date of
listing of the IPO is controlled by the variable
MKT in the regression model. The underpricing
of IPOs is conjectured to be larger during bullish
markets (therefore positive coefficient for this
variable) than during bearish markets. For
example, the average underpricing of IPOs on
the second board during 1990-1992 (bearish
period) was 40% whereas in 1993-1995 (the
bullish period) the average premiums were 85%
(Cheng et al. 1996). The MKT variable is
measured by the first-order moving average of
the 15-day market trend prior to the first day of
listing. The market trend is proxied by the daily
returns on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange's
Composite Index.
TABLE 1
Descriptive analysis of average underpricing by
auditing firms and auditing firm reputation
of IPOs on the Second Board of KLSE
Regression Results
Table 3 summarizes the results of the regression
analysis of second board IPOs. All the signs of
the coefficients are in the expected direction.
The standard deviation (SD) and the net profit
margin ( PM) variables are significant at 5%
Intercept -0.805 1.371 -0.587
AGE -0.251 0.869 -0.289
INSIDER -0.873 0.137 -0.637
SD 6.4] 2.44 2.63* +
NP~"I -0.256 0.091 -2.87':'
U\\'
-0.864 0.091 -9.49*
MKT 0.026 0.007 3.71* +
AUD -0.348 0.916 0.379
R"=8.53 F=1.94 N=100
Auditing Firm
By Classification
Big Six
KPlvlG Peat Manvick
Emst & Young
Coopers & Lybrand
Arthur Andersen
Plice Waterhouse
Deloine Ross Tohmatsu
All Big Six
Non Big six
Overall
Number
Of IPOs
19
14
12
9
7
2
63
37
100
Average
Underpricing
(%)
79.6
59.6
65.4
85.3
101.6
75.1
75.6
72.3
74.4
CoefTi-
cient
Standard t - Statistic Expected
Error Sign
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level whereas the underwriter reputation (UW)
and the market trend variable (MKT) are
significant at 1% level. These findings suggest
that the underpricing of IPOs is positively related
to the ex anle uncertainty and underpricing of
IPOs is larger during bullish rather than bearish
markets, consistent with the findings of Beatty
and Ritter (1986). The financial measure of
expected IPO vahlt, as estimated by the NPM
variable suggests I hat the level of premiums is
inversely related LO the expected financi;d
performance. The underwriter reputation i,
perceived as risk surrogate by investors as th,'
level of premiums is inversely related to this
variable. The AGE and the INSIDER variables
are not significant. The variable of interest,
auditor reputation, does not support the
conjecture that the level of premiums is inversely
related to the auditor reputation. The measure
of auditor firm reputation based on the Big Six
or otherwise is a crude measure and therefore a
more robust measure would be in terms of the
compensation paid to the auditing firm, since
Ihe larger the compensation of the reputable
auditing firm, the less ex an/f' uncertainty and
therefore the lower the level of premiums.
However, information on the amount of
compensation to the auditing firms and the
costs of performing the audit (this information
is required to run the two-stage least square
regression) is not made available upon request.
Therefore the refinement of the present analysis
is not possible. Another possible surrogate of
auditor firm reputation variables is the number
of the companies audited by the auditing firms
within the Big Six group. A dummy variable
regression was run to test the auditor reputation
hypothesis with a value of 1 assigned for IPOs
audited by KPMG Peat Manvick, Ernst & Young
and Coopers & Lybrand, and zero othenvise.
The results (not reported here) are not
significantly different from those reported in
Table 3, suggesting no significant relationship
between auditor firm reputation and the level of
underpricing of second board IPOs. These
results, however, could be due to the weakness
of the surrogate variable of auditor firm
reputation.
CONCLUSION
In this study it is conjectured that the reputable
auditing finns auest to the accuracy of the IPO
management disclosures in prospectuses and
therefore reduce the ex anle uncertainty
regarding the potential value of the firm. This
implies an expected inverse relationship between
levels of underpricing of IPOs associated with
reputable auditing firms. The findings, however,
do not support this conjecture. The coefficient
or the auditor reputation variable (AUD) is
negative but not statistically significant, even
after taking another surrogate (the number of
the companies audited by each of the big-six
audit firms) of auditing firm reputation. The
findings imply that Malaysian investors do not
differentiate between the services of reputable
and those considered less reputable auditing
firms. The invesl.ors assume that all qualified
and licensed auditing firms provide
homogeneous services. These findings are
inconsistent with those of Balvers el al. (1989)
and DeAngelo (1981) on the US market and
consistent with the findings of Ng el al.(1994)
on the Hong Kong market. The findings on the
US market suggest that investors do differentiate
between the services of reputable auditing finns
and those considered less reputable, whereas
the study on the Hong Kong market suggests a
supply of homogenous auditing services.
However, the findings show that the
underwriter reputation (UW) and the past
profitability of the company (NPM) variables are
inversely related to the level of second board
IPO underpricing. The market trend and the
standard deviation variables are positively
associated 1.0 the level of IPO underpricing.
These findings supports the ex ante uncertainty
hypothesis suggested by Beatty and Ritter (1986).
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